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“Outside of Being”: Animal Being in Agamben’s Reading of Hei-
degger 
Simone Gustafsson 
In The Open: Man and Animal, Giorgio Agamben draws attention to the 
fundamental antagonisms and ambiguities that mark the attempt to co-
gently articulate a definition of man in relation to animal being. Agamben 
traces the foundational moment of the concept of ―life‖ in the history of 
Western philosophy to Aristotle‘s isolation of the nutritive function in De An-
ima.
1
 This isolatable ―nutritive life‖ becomes the ground or essential com-
monality on top of which other faculties are hierarchically organised. This 
formulation thus makes it possible to separate higher animals from lower 
ones, as well as identify the ―life‖ within being that is considered ―common‖ 
or vegetative. It is the possibility of an isolation or separation of this kind 
that is crucial insofar as it sets up an aporetic relationship between human 
and animal life, a relation decisive for both Agamben‘s political and onto-
logical thought.  
It is not surprising that Agamben‘s discussion of animal being in this 
text engages primarily with Martin Heidegger‘s work, most notably his 
1929–1930 course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Fi-
nitude, Solitude.
2
 Heidegger‘s notion of animality has been charged with a 
profound anthropocentrism and subject to numerous critiques by philoso-
phers including Jacques Derrida, Leonard Lawlor, Kelly Oliver, Cary Wolfe, 
Matthew Calarco, and Akira Lippit, among others.
3
 The problematic and at 
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times ambiguous nature of Heidegger‘s theory of animal life has been 
widely discussed, and is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the focus 
of the present inquiry is limited to Agamben‘s reading of Heidegger in The 
Open and the characterisation of animal life that follows. Agamben critiques 
the alleged ontological pre-eminence of Dasein through an analysis of Hei-
degger‘s notion of profound boredom, in which, according to Agamben, we 
find man in a state of infinitesimal proximity to animal being. At this critical 
juncture we can glimpse the nature of man‘s specific difference from animal 
being as it functions in Agamben‘s work. This paper closely examines 
Agamben‘s discussion of Heidegger and argues that Agamben‘s reading is 
problematic. Consequently, the ―letting be‖ of beings in Heidegger‘s ac-
count grants animal being a more radical externality than that found in 
Agamben‘s theorisation. Insofar as the notion of animality is a critical con-
stituent of Agamben‘s ontological and political theory—the figure of the 
animal traverses the ―doublets‖ that feature prominently in Agamben‘s 
texts, namely zoē/bios, living being/speaking being, homo 
sacer/sovereign—there is much at stake in the concept of animal being that 
Agamben develops through his analyses of Heidegger. In fact, despite its 
omission from the Homo Sacer series, the concepts developed in The 
Open should in fact be read as continuous with those found in Homo 
Sacer, State of Exception, and his earlier text Language and Death.
4
 As 
Kelly Oliver argues, ―the human-animal divide, then, is not only political but 
also sets up the very possibility of politics.‖5 As such, an investigation of 
Agamben‘s notion of animal life is of relevance not only to the field of ―criti-
cal animality studies‖6 but to his notion of bare life, biopolitics and ―speak-
ing being,‖ insofar as the concept is absolutely central to—and can in fact 
be said to underlie or ground—the ―political‖ itself. 
I.  Reading Agamben Against Heidegger 
Heidegger‘s course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, includes 
an extended discussion of animal life; however this is far from its primary 
focus—rather, animality is theorised with regard to its proper manner of be-
ing, in order to develop a concept of man as finitude and being-in-the-
world. Heidegger‘s ―preliminary appraisal‖ at the outset declares philosophy 
to be a kind of homesickness, a being taken at all times ―within the 
whole‖—and the character of this wholeness is the ―world.‖7 As always al-
ready drawn to this ―whole‖ and yet always awaiting it, there is an intrinsic 
restlessness to man; Heidegger terms ―finitude‖ the ―unrest of this ‗not,‘‖ 
and argues that it is not a state nor an incidental property but rather a ―fun-
damental way of being.‖8 Man‘s subsequent individuation or solitude is a 
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result of this becoming-finite, which only occurs because of, and indeed 
with, ―world.‖ Thus the three concepts—world, finitude, and solitude—form 
a unity, and the discussion of animality must be contextualised as belong-
ing to this larger analysis of metaphysics and the essence of man. Indeed, 
Heidegger‘s renowned tripartite thesis constitutes an attempt to understand 
the essence of ―the other beings which, like man, are also part of the 
world,‖ with regard to their relationship to and difference from the ―having 
world‖ that marks man: ―[1.] the stone (material object) is worldless; [2.] the 
animal is poor in world; [3.] man is world-forming.‖9 Agamben‘s critique will 
consist in drawing attention to a critical proximity between the captivation of 
the animal and Dasein‘s thrownness in the state of profound boredom. 
However, it will be argued that in Agamben‘s reading of Heidegger he 
makes a series of claims that emerge as untenable and which, instead of 
critiquing Heidegger‘s theses in a productive way (that is, as creating more 
possibilities for thinking animal life), serves instead to limit them.  
The formulation of man as animal rationale, the living being that has 
language, is a metaphysical definition Heidegger consistently rejects, as 
Agamben points out. This definition of the human being as zoon logon 
echon is for Heidegger a traditionally anthropological description, in which 
zoon is taken as present-at-hand and in time.
10
 Later, in the ―Letter on Hu-
manism,‖ Heidegger will return to this formulation and characterise it as 
metaphysical insofar as this ―first humanism‖ [Roman humanism that con-
siders man to be an animal rationale] does not ask after the Being of be-
ings—in both the ratio of man and the zoon of the animal, ―an interpretation 
of ‗life‘ is already posited,‖ the Being of beings is ―already illumined and 
propriated in its truth.‖11 Indeed, Heidegger rejects the biological under-
standing of life: ―Life is not a mere being-present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein. 
In turn, Dasein is never to be defined ontologically by regarding it as (onto-
logically indefinite) life plus something else.‖12 Such scientific theories—
Heidegger specifically names anthropology, psychology, and biology—fail 
to provide an ―ontologically adequate answer to the question of the kind of 
being of this being that we ourselves are.‖13 In addition, this conception, 
which manifests in modern anthropology as a notion of being ―where the 
res cogitans, consciousness, and the context of experience, serve as the 
methodological point of departure,‖14 forecloses the possibility of attune-
ment or Stimmung, a crucial concept in Heidegger‘s work.  
Heidegger argues that man is characterised by an essentially different 
manner of being to that of animal life. In fact, he writes that ―it finally re-
mains to ask whether the essence of man primordially and most decisively 
lies in the dimension of animalitas at all.‖15 In ―Letter on Humanism,‖ this 
questioning quickly turns into a declaration: living creatures ―are in a certain 
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way most closely akin to us, and on the other are at the same time sepa-
rated from our ek-sistent essence by an abyss.‖16 In the development of the 
theme of ―world‖ in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, this abys-
sal separation between man and animal reveals a ―peculiar proximity,‖ ac-
cording to Agamben. He writes of the abyss between animal and man in 
Heidegger‘s course: ―not only does animalitas become utterly unfamiliar 
and appear as ‗that which is most difficult to think,‘ but humanitas also ap-
pears as something ungraspable and absent, suspended as it is between a 
‗not-being-able-to-remain‘ and a ‗not-being-able-to-leave-its-place.‘‖17 Thus, 
he will attempt to complicate this abyssal separation between man and 
animal—an attempt that positions Agamben, albeit only superficially, in line 
with Derrida‘s critique of Heidegger—by throwing into question the seem-
ingly unwavering and unsurpassable fissure itself. 
Agamben describes the important influence of Jakob von Uexküll on 
Heidegger‘s notion of animal world and environment, not least because the 
concepts Heidegger employs seem to correlate directly with Uexküll‘s ter-
minology. That is, Heidegger gives the name Enthemmungsring, ―disinhibit-
ing ring,‖ to what Uexküll termed Umwelt or ―environment.‖18 Indeed, in 
Heidegger‘s characterisation of animal life, ―the animal is closed in the cir-
cle of its disinhibitors just as, according to Uexküll, it is closed in the few 
elements that define its perceptual world.‖19 According to Agamben, Hei-
degger departs from Uexküll when he characterises the poverty in world of 
the animal in contradistinction to the world-forming of man. Captivation 
(Benommenheit) is posited as the mode of being proper to the animal, the 
fundamental manner of engaging.
20
 The animal is captivated by its disin-
hibitor—and is ―wholly absorbed‖ insofar as captivation takes the animal 
―as a whole‖—and as such cannot be said to truly ―act‖ or ―comport‖ itself, 
but only to ―behave‖ (related to the distinction between ―response‖ and ―re-
action‖).21 That towards which the animal behaves, however, is essentially 
withheld from the animal as a being; thus Agamben writes that ―being [is in-
troduced] into the animal‘s environment negatively—through its withhold-
ing.‖22 This withholding, however, is ―neither disclosed nor closed off,‖ there 
is a central ambiguity in Heidegger‘s characterisation of animal openness: 
according to Agamben, the ―not being able to have-to-do-with‖ that marks 
the animal is ―not purely negative.‖23 Thus, Agamben claims that the es-
sence of the animal‘s relation to world is not simply that of pure deprivation, 
but simultaneously one of lack, an assertion that rests on the concept of 
animal captivation: 
The ontological status of the animal environment can at this point be 
defined: it is offen (open) but not offenbar (disconcealed; lit., 
openable). For the animal, beings are open but not accessible. … 
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This openness without disconcealment distinguishes the animal‘s 
poverty in world from the world-forming which characterizes man.
24
 
Captivation constitutes the essence of the animal‘s manner of being 
and is the fundamental mode of access or openness—albeit obscure—to 
―world.‖ In captivation, the animal is absorbed or taken by something that 
remains withheld, and ―neither its so-called environment nor the animal it-
self are manifest as beings.‖25 Nonetheless, the animal is driven and ―di-
rected in its manifold instinctual activities.‖26 As such, Heidegger writes, 
―because of this driven directedness the animal finds itself suspended, as it 
were, between itself and its environment, even though neither the one nor 
the other is experienced as being.‖27 However, in Section 57, Heidegger 
claims that the essence of life and of the organism is ―being capable‖: ―only 
something that is capable, and remains capable, is alive.‖28 To be capable 
in this sense—as opposed to the comportment of man—is to be capable of 
behaviour or a ―driven performing [Treiben].‖29 Thus this ―suspension‖ is not 
a petrification—the animal has the ―capability for …,‖ that is, the potential to 
be disinhibited or affected by something. Agamben emphasises this possi-
bility of being affected; that which disinhibits, despite the fact that it cannot 
become manifest to the animal, nonetheless ―brings an essential disruption 
into the essence of the animal.‖30 
Furthermore, Heidegger writes that the ―self-encirclement‖ of the ani-
mal is not to be equated with ―encapsulation,‖ but rather, ―the encirclement 
is precisely drawn about the animal in such a way that it opens up a sphere 
within which whatever disinhibits can do so in this or that manner.‖31 The 
animal‘s poverty in world thus appears to pivot on the characterisation of 
the mode of access and accessibility to that which disinhibits the encircling 
ring, in short on the ontological condition of captivation. That is, Heidegger 
presents an account of animal life that maintains an abyssal difference be-
tween man and animal, and yet this distinction appears, at this stage of the 
argument at least, to apply namely to the question of access or openness 
to world or environment—and not a difference of substance. Finally, with 
regard to this obscure or ambiguous access (and ensuing disruption) that 
marks captivation, Agamben argues that captivation can be conceived as 
―a sort of fundamental Stimmung in which the animal does not open itself, 
as does Dasein, in a world, yet is nevertheless ecstatically drawn outside of 
itself in an exposure which disrupts it in its every fiber.‖32 Animal captivation 
appears to resonate unexpectedly with the fundamental attunement of pro-
found boredom as explicated earlier in the course.
33
 Agamben here claims 
that ―the understanding of the human world‖ is possible only in relation to 
this ―exposure without disconcealment‖ that characterises animal being.34 
Furthermore, he asserts that it is not that the human is presupposed in the 
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development of an account of animal being, but rather that the ―openness 
of the human world … can be achieved only by means of an operation en-
acted upon the not-open of the animal world.‖35 It is in profound boredom 
that man‘s fundamental attunement appears almost to converge with ani-
mal captivation. 
Heidegger characterizes two structural moments of boredom, ―being 
left empty‖ [Leergelassenheit] and ―being held in limbo‖ [hingehalten].‖36 In 
the first structural moment, the emptiness of ―being left empty‖ derives from 
a kind of abandonment by the present-at-hand.
37
 In a boring situation, the 
things present at hand in the environing world leave man empty, which is to 
say, man is ―offered nothing by what is at hand.‖38 According to Agamben, 
this being ―delivered over to beings that refuse themselves‖ reveals ―the 
constitutive structure‖ of Dasein: ―Dasein can be riveted to beings that re-
fuse themselves in their totality because it is constitutively ―delivered,‖ and 
―factically ―thrown‖ and ―lost‖ in the world of its concern.‖39 Agamben thus 
makes his first claim regarding Dasein and animal being:  
In becoming bored, Dasein is delivered over [ausgeliefert] to some-
thing that refuses itself, exactly as the animal, in its captivation, is 
exposed [hinausgesetzt] in something unrevealed.
40
 
Common to both this structural moment of boredom and the animal‘s 
captivation is an ―open to a closedness,‖ a being bound and delivered over 
to something which does not manifest itself.
41
 The second structural mo-
ment, ―being held in limbo‖ [Hingehaltenheit] or ―being-held-in-suspense‖42 
consists in ―being delivered over to beings‘ telling refusal of themselves as 
a whole.‖43 In this moment of boredom this telling refusal points to Dasein‘s 
―possibilities left unexploited,‖ that is, it makes such possibilities manifest 
through refusing them.
44
 Agamben characterises such possibilities as 
standing before Dasein ―in their absolute indifference, both present and 
perfectly inaccessible at the same time.‖45 It is precisely this manifestation 
via indifference or deactivation, as it were, that reveals the ―disconcealing 
of the originary possibilitization‖ of Dasein.46 Agamben is in the position to 
make his second claim, again reading animal captivation as conceptually 
proximate to human boredom: 
What the animal is precisely unable to do is suspend and deactivate 
its relationship with the ring of its specific disinhibitors. … Profound 
boredom then appears as the metaphysical operator in which the 
passage from poverty in world to world, from animal environment to 
human world, is realized; at issue here is nothing less than anthro-
pogenesis, the becoming Da-sein of living man.
47
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Agamben can now locate that passage which would enable continuity 
between man and animal that Ernst Haeckel had posited and later claimed 
to have found evidence of, in the ability of man to become profoundly 
bored. He argues that the ―irresolvable struggle between unconcealedness 
and concealedness‖ which defines ―world‖ for Heidegger is nothing other 
than ―the internal struggle between man and animal.‖48 His final assertion:  
Dasein is simply an animal that has learned to become bored; it has 
awakened from its own captivation to its own captivation. This 




The problem of ―world‖ would thus be analysed in terms of a becom-
ing-human, which is founded on the captivation of animal being. As such, 
Agamben claims to have uncovered the ―metaphysical operator‖ that can 
explain anthropogenesis but which resists both the notion of man as essen-
tially distinct from animals, and the continuity thesis that propounds an evo-
lutionarily intermediary ―stage‖ between the two. In an archetypal theorisa-
tion, Agamben claims that anthropogenesis occurs through the suspension 
or deactivation of animal captivation, and thus questions the extent to 
which Heidegger escapes the ―metaphysical primacy of animalitas‖—
insofar as humanity must necessarily ―keep itself open to the closedness of 
animality.‖50 The mechanism of suspension (similar to that which sanctions 
the inclusive exclusion of zoē in the polis) allows him to maintain the sepa-
ration of animal and man while retaining the sense of intimacy and tension 
between the two. 
II. Reading Heidegger Against Agamben 
We can now outline Agamben‘s reading of Heidegger. He first postulates 
that in the fundamental attunement of profound boredom we can discern a 
remarkable proximity to the captivation that defines animal essence. In his 
analysis of the second structural moment of boredom, being-held-in-
suspense, he argues that Dasein is ―delivered over‖ exactly as the animal 
is ―exposed‖ in captivation; in this telling refusal the originary possibilitisa-
tion of man himself is revealed. Up to this point, Agamben is primarily con-
cerned with demonstrating the structural similarities between the two by 
setting them up alongside each other—however, in his final argument these 
converge in the thesis that Dasein is ―simply an animal that has learned to 
become bored‖ to the extent that animal life is equated with the living being 
of man: ―the awakening of the living being to its own being-captivated … is 
the human.‖51 That is, in his final argument the emphasis shifts from a dis-
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cussion of the essential mode of access or openness to world, that is, the 
relationship with its disinhibitors that would define the essence of a being‘s 
―manner of being,‖ to an assertion regarding a commonality of substance, a 
shared ground which would pre-exist the distinction between world and 
poverty-in-world, captivation or being-taken, behaviour or comportment, as 
well as the intrinsic ambiguity of openness. Insofar as Agamben‘s argument 
regarding the human thus far revolves around two poles, the specific rela-
tion between them, and the political articulations they permit—man and 
animal, speaking and living being, bios and zoē—this assertion constitutes 
an attempt to found a commonality in which the human was pre-historically 
essentially ―united,‖ as it were, prior to the open realm of pure possibilities. 
Indeed, as Agamben writes in Infancy and History, the disjuncture between 
language and speech is the precondition for the historicity of man; for 
Agamben, ―animals do not enter language, they are already inside it,‖ while 
man, ―preceding speech, splits this single language and, in order to speak, 
has to constitute himself as the subject of language.‖52 In other words, if 
man is the animal that has become bored and becomes a speaking being, 
this specific ―becoming‖ that Agamben designates as anthropogenesis 
must itself derive from something which both exceeds and is more originary 
than these conceptual doubles—a more originary realm that the human is 
capable of interrupting or suspending. This anthropogenesis occurs 
through the compulsion towards the ―singular extremity‖ of an ―originary 
making possible,‖ the ―utmost extremity of the possibilitization proper to 
Dasein as such.‖53 In Agamben‘s account, it is through this exposure to, or 
being-driven-towards, its own being-possible that marks man‘s essence, 
insofar as it reveals (through a refusal) all the concrete possibilities of man, 
and thus constitutes the moment in which man as such departs or diverges 
from animality. On the one hand, Agamben stresses the proximity between 
animal captivation and the state of profound boredom, and thus problema-
tises Heidegger‘s abyssal distinction between human and animal. On the 
other hand, as Dominick LaCapra points out, ―Agamben himself seems to 
assume or require a radical divide between human and animal,‖ in order to 
conceive of the ―abyssal, alluring divide itself, as a zone of indistinction be-
tween human and animal.‖54 Thus it is both this posited convergence of the 
essence of man and animal, as well as the revelation of originary possi-
bilitisation, which constitute the main contentions of his argument. In order 
to analyse this, we must engage in a closer reading of Heidegger‘s course. 
At the beginning of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Hei-
degger addresses the ambiguity of the meaning of physis or nature in Pre-
Socratic thought. Physis is ―that which prevails,‖ meaning ―not only that 
which itself prevails, but that which prevails in its prevailing or the prevailing 
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of whatever prevails‖—physis appears to encapsulate the totality of object, 
subject, and action, crudely put.
55
 On the other hand, physis also denotes 
the nature of beings, that ―innermost essence‖ or inner law, that meaning 
which we put to use when speaking of the nature ―of‖ something.56 In Aris-
totle, physis remains a unity of two meanings, which have shifted: physis 
now means ―beings as a whole,‖ as well as having ―the sense of ousia, the 
essentiality of beings as such.‖57 Aristotle calls ―First philosophy‖ or prote 
philosophia this questioning concerning both the notion of ―beings as a 
whole‖ and the essence of beings. According to Heidegger, the term 
―metaphysics‖ that he uses in this course is to be understood both as de-
scriptive and, more fundamentally, as a task: we must understand the 
―originary understanding‖ of First philosophy as expressing ―philosophizing 
proper,‖ which is what metaphysics must become—it is not that metaphys-
ics gives rise to First philosophy, but that metaphysics must be given its 
meaning ―from out of an originary understanding‖ of prote philosophia.58 
That is, our inquiry into ―world,‖ animal being and man as world-forming is a 
properly metaphysical inquiry that must investigate both the ―as a whole‖ 
and the essence of beings. It is only Dasein that has access to this ―as a 
whole‖ and as such can have ―world,‖ insofar as man is capable of encoun-
tering beings as beings. 
The ambiguity of the openness of animal captivation has been noted 
by Agamben. Heidegger is adamant that an understanding of animal open-
ness can stem from neither the mechanist conception of life nor the vitalist 
tradition. We have seen that the self-encirclement of the animal does not 
constitute a totally closed encapsulation—encirclement constitutes the pos-
sibility of an openness to that which disinhibits. Heidegger writes that the 
animal‘s poverty in world is ―nonetheless a kind of wealth,‖ and that the life 
of the animal ―possesses a wealth of openness with which the human world 
may have nothing to compare‖; that is, Heidegger maintains that this im-
poverishment does not establish a value judgement on the kind of substan-
tial life of the animal, but rather denotes a difference in mode of accessibil-
ity.
59
 He claims: ―The animal is acquainted with the ditch it jumps over as a 
simple matter of fact [Sachverhalt], but not as a concept [Begriff].‖60 How-
ever, if animals in their captivation cannot grasp beings as being present at 
hand, that is, if beings are not ―disclosed‖ to it, this means that neither are 
they ―closed off‖ from it: captivation in Heidegger‘s account is indifferent to 
this possibility, which is to say that animals do not have ―less‖ world in a 
substantial sense, but have an openness to world that essentially differs 
from the mode of access to world of Dasein. 
As William McNeill writes, the animal ―moves outside of the play of 
disclosedness and concealment, beyond the possible alternative of Being 
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or not Being.‖61 It is not that the animal is incapable of negativity, but rather 
that this capability stands outside the realm of animal being, which would 
be outside or indifferent to this mode of access. That is, for Heidegger, the 
animal is outside of the ―not-capable‖ of negativity. Thus Michel Haar as-
serts that ―animals do not know nothingness,‖ and that animal being can 
neither ―let beings be‖ nor not ―let beings be.‖62 Since we are analysing 
animality ―in the realm of what is essential,‖ Heidegger claims that the 
question of whether the animal is a ―lower‖ form of life and man a ―higher‖ 
one, is ―questionable even as a question.‖63 Indeed, according to Stuart El-
den, animals ―are not distinct from humans in any straightforward way in 
Heidegger‘s analysis, but only through a comparison to the particular mode 
of existence of humans.‖64 In fact, Heidegger himself concedes that ―it is 
only from the human perspective that the animal is poor with respect to 
world‖; it is only from the standpoint of the human that we can comprehend 
something like the deprivation of world.
65
 
As such, Heidegger argues that we must attempt to determine the 
concept of poverty in world insofar as it relates to the ―phenomenon of 
world,‖ but not in a manner that would hierarchise this relation. Insofar as 
the difference between animal and Dasein is, strictly speaking, an ontologi-
cal one in the sense that for Heidegger animal life has a fundamentally 
other way of being, an otherness that is not ontic but pertains to the very 
essence of animality, Agamben‘s formulation of man as an animal that has 
become bored is difficult to maintain. Heidegger nowhere maintains that 
man and animal derive from a singular origin. On the contrary, Haar asserts 
that ―Heidegger wants to show the impossibility of an original and funda-
mental implication or entanglement of human Dasein in living beings, to 
destroy the idea of an animal lineage.‖66 Tracy Colony cogently argues that 
Agamben‘s account of Heidegger‘s course rests on the ―unquestioned pre-
supposition that a living being is the origin of the openness proper to hu-
man being.‖67 Rather, living being or animal being does not firstly exist as 
an ontic substance that is subsequently made open; openness is intrinsic, 
coeval with being. Additionally, Agamben pinpoints the difference between 
animal captivation ―and the opening of the possible in Dasein‖ to the ―single 
operation of allowing the original captivating power of the animal‘s envi-
ronment to be deactivated.‖68 This single ―cut,‖ as it were, defines and ori-
ents a ―linear‖ difference in the sense that this metaphysical operation acts 
as a bridge and not as a division. This authorises Agamben‘s argument that 
―the nontruth that also belongs originarily to the truth‖ (the secret of uncon-
cealedness at the center of truth as aletheia), is ―the not-open of the ani-
mal,‖ and that this ―irresolvable struggle between unconcealedness and 
concealedness … which defines the human world, is the internal struggle 
░    Animal Being in Agamben‘s Reading of Heidegger 13 
between man and animal.‖69 Thus Agamben subsumes animal life insofar 
as he locates the problem of animal being as that of living being (zoē), in 
the direction of the human, a development that is not supported by Heideg-
ger‘s analyses of animality, from which Agamben claims to have derived 
his assertions. In his reading of Heidegger, Agamben claims to have dis-
covered the metaphysical operator that gives rise to the notion of the hu-
man as a conflicted relation between animal and man that inheres in the 
human.  
Additionally, Colony writes that ―while Agamben stresses the continuity 
between animal captivation and the sense of captivation proper to profound 
boredom, the term which Heidegger almost exclusively uses … is not cap-
tivation but rather, entrancement,‖ a notion which Heidegger will under-
stand in relation to the crucial dimension of temporality, which will then 
need to be taken into account.
70
 As noted above, for Agamben the ―origi-
nary making possible‖ which is disconcealed in profound boredom reveals 
the originary and proper possibilitisation that belongs to the essence of 
man (tied to his notion of pure potentiality outlined elsewhere). The tempo-
ral character of this ―being held in limbo‖ proper to profound boredom is not 
discussed by Agamben, but is a critical element in Heidegger‘s account of 
―world.‖ In profound boredom, it is the ―one‖ who is attuned, not—no longer, 
or not yet—the ―I.‖ What is revealed is the ―it is boring for one,‖ not ―this or 
that being that we are bored by.‖71 As such, the ―it is boring for one‖ is tied 
to the notion of the ―as a whole.‖ In this situation, all beings present at hand 
―recede into an indifference,‖ including the self of Dasein—and yet ―this pe-
culiar impoverishment … first brings the self in all its nakedness to itself as 
the self that is there and has taken over the being-there of its Da-sein.‖72 In 
profound boredom, or the ―it is boring for one,‖ being is ―delivered over to 
beings‖ telling refusal of themselves ―as a whole.‖73 This refusal or with-
drawal of beings as a whole can only be possible ―if Dasein as such can no 
longer go along with them,‖ if it is ―entranced.‖74 According to Heidegger, 
―what entrances is nothing other than the temporal horizon‖ itself, which is 
―neither merely the present nor merely the past nor merely the future,‖ but 
―their unarticulated unity.‖75 That is, profound boredom is marked by an ex-
perience of time in which time itself (as understood chronologically, as a 
sequence of ―nows‖) seems to recede.  
In The Time of Life: Heidegger and Ethos, McNeill explains that living 
being must ―take up an independent stance in relation to something outside 
of and beyond not only that which is presenting itself, but beyond the pre-
sent of whatever is presenting itself at each moment‖ in order to endure 
within the temporal flow.
76
 Thus the temporality of Dasein is characterised 
as ek-static, insofar as Dasein can assume a stance ―outside of its own Be-
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ing, a stance or ‗holding‘ of oneself.‖77 Heidegger terms this possibility of 
self-disclosure ―freedom.‖78 Since Dasein is not present at hand, but is ―set 
in the midst of beings‖ in the temporal horizon, Dasein ―is there [da], that is, 
opens itself up [sich aufschlieβt] in its manifestness, that is, resolutely dis-
closes itself.‖79 Heidegger writes that ―the moment of vision [Augenblick] is 
nothing other than the look of resolute disclosedness [Blick der 
Entschlossenheit] in which the full situation of an action opens itself and 
keeps itself open.‖80 Thus in the entrancement of boredom, Dasein is im-
pelled ―into its proper essence, i.e., toward the moment of vision as the 
fundamental possibility of existence proper.‖81 Therefore, as Colony points 
out, the proximity Agamben detects between captivation and the being 
taken in profound boredom is not as self-evident as it would first appear. It 
is difficult to maintain the thesis that profound boredom ―appears as the 
metaphysical operator‖ that bridges animal environment and human world, 
insofar as animality is exempt from the essential temporality of Dasein and 
cannot take up a free stance in the midst of beings. While animals are cap-
tivated—and open, in a certain way—by their encircling ring, the so-called 
―captivation‖ that is proper to profound boredom is the entrancement by the 
unity of the temporal horizon; this difference is one of essence and cannot 
be conceived as a continuity.
82
  
III. “Letting Be” of Beings 
Agamben concludes The Open with a chapter entitled ―Outside of Being,‖ 
in which he writes: 
Insofar as the animal knows neither beings nor nonbeings, neither 
open nor closed, it is outside of being; it is outside in an exteriority 
more external than any open, and inside in an intimacy more internal 
than any closedness. To let the animal be would then mean: to let it 
be outside of being.
83
  
Animal being is excluded from the political, inhabiting a realm of the non- or 
extra-political that is nevertheless not a state of exception; not banned but 
barred, animality is the necessity that serves as the counterpoint to human 
potentiality, the natural life that pre-exists the natural-ised life of the 
zoē/bios doublet. Paradoxically, it lacks the indistinction and oscillation that 
gives rise to the formulation of man as that which lacks a proper vocation. It 
is the specific lack of the human that gives rise to an ontological difference, 
a ―lack‖ different in kind or in essence from the animal‘s lack of world. De-
noted as life governed by necessity, as a being that has no stake in its own 
life or way of living, animality grounds the empty uncertainty or negativity of 
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man. Without language use (because it is already ―in‖ language), it ―pre-
pares,‖ so to speak, the ontological ground for the subsequent definitions of 
man. Furthermore, such definitions retroactively posit the animal as marked 
by privation. The ways in which both concepts of negativity function must 
be clarified and exposed, in order to grasp what is really at stake in Agam-
ben‘s formulation of animality and his critique of Heidegger. Heidegger 
achieves an externality, an ―outside‖ that is more radical, insofar as animal 
being is outside of negativity; for Agamben, in his account of anthropogen-
esis and the being‘s suspension of its disinhibitors, the animal becomes in-
capable of negativity, of interrupting its realm of im-mediacy. The risk in let-
ting being be ―outside of being‖ is that animal being is already outside if the 
concept of ―being‖ itself is always already traversed by the human—it is not 
Aristotelian simple, natural life, not politically qualified life, and neither can it 
be the life that is ―taken out,‖ the bare life of the exception, the properly po-
litical element. It is an ―outside‖ marked by the mechanism of suspension. 
Insofar as the notion of animality grounds the understanding of natural zoē 
and thus bare life, animal life can be said to belong to a realm from which 
―living being‖ has been subtracted, but whose humanist configuration re-
mains in force. That is to say, when Agamben describes the stopping of the 
anthropological machine according to Walter Benjamin‘s notion of ―dialectic 
at a standstill,‖84 this ―resolution‖ remains a humanist concern.  
Agamben concludes The Open with a call to render inoperative what 
he terms the ―anthropological machine‖ that ―governs our conception of 
man‖ and which functions through the ―simultaneous division and articula-
tion of the animal and the human.‖85 Yet it can be argued that Agamben‘s 
reading of Heidegger constitutes such an articulation in the development of 
his final thesis: not only do we find an attunement in which Dasein comes 
close to the essential manner of animal being, but Agamben claims to dis-
cover in this proximity a possibility of continuity between the two. Here, 
where an essential distinction collapses into an account of anthropogen-
esis, animal life (or ―living being‖ in Agamben‘s parlance) is taken, sus-
pended, and consequently included via exclusion. As such, it can be ar-
gued that the notion of the letting-be of the animal, with which Agamben 
concludes The Open, is more ―positive‖—in the sense of permitting an 
―outside‖ which would not be the externality which is included via exclu-
sion—in Heidegger‘s conception than in Agamben‘s. McNeill writes that 
while the animal ―in its radical openness‖ is refused the possibility of a free 
stance in relation to beings, this can be understood as ―precisely the refusal 
in which the animal shows itself to us in its specific otherness.‖86 In main-
taining the essential abyssal difference between Dasein and animal open-
ness, Heidegger thus appears to grant animality an externality more radical 
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than that of Agamben‘s unsavable, blessed life at the end of history. That is 
to say, the topology of the otherness of the animal in Heidegger‘s account 
constitutes an externality that is ―outside‖ in a different sense to the ―out-
side‖ in Agamben‘s formulation; for Agamben, animality, insofar as there is 
an animality-humanity continuity, is an interiority that is suspended, taken 
outside. Accordingly, the place of animal being in Agamben‘s messianic 
politics remains unclear. Agamben‘s scrupulous and rigorous critique of 
biopolitics, sovereignty and law constitutes a critical appraisal of modern 
politics, and his formulation of a ―form-of-life‖87 and ―coming community‖ 
outlines an exigent political project. It is perhaps all the more necessary, 
then, to investigate the ontological human-animal distinction that subsists in 
the notion of the human as ―pure potentiality,‖ itself derived in part from the 
posited ontological otherness of animality. This would in turn lead to an 
analysis of the conspicuous absence of animal life in Agamben‘s writings 
on biopolitics, insofar as ontology and politics are inseparable in Agam-
ben‘s philosophy. 
Animal being in Agamben‘s formulation appears to be both ―outside‖ 
and the ―ground‖ that subtends subsequent articulations of man. However, 
this ―outside‖ is no longer the radical difference (abyssal for Heidegger) of 
externality, but rather becomes intrinsic to anthropogenesis—animal being 
is captured, encoded within an anthropogenic trajectory and suspended in 
the becoming-man of man as ―pure potentiality,‖ as the power of deactiva-
tion, the capacity to become bored. As Colony writes, for Agamben ―the 
openness which defines the human‖ in Heidegger ―harbor[s] within it an im-
plicit structural dependence upon the living being as the site from out of 
which an operation of anthropogenesis has been achieved.‖88 Heidegger‘s 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics does not support such a reading.  
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